The Russian military exercises earlier this year were notable for a number of reasons. First, the Russian invasions of Georgia and the Ukraine were both preceded by military exercises in the nearby area. This time Russia ran the exercises near the Baltic states. A heavy hint to them not to get in trouble with Russia.
Second, under international agreements any exercise involving more than 13,000 personnel must have international observers. Each exercise did stay under this figure but neighbouring exercises were run in parallel, adhering to the letter but not the spirit of the agreement. This allowed Russia to practise large-scale war-making without giving away their tactics.
Third, the Russians demonstrated that their forces are more effective than analysts expected, having modernised thoroughly both in equipment and command capability. This indicates that stopping them would require more force than previously assumed or planned for. The head of German foreign intelligence advised that western governments need to increase their military spending to keep up. The former UK head of Joint Forces Command says the British Army is 20 years behind Russia and would not survive a Russian assault.
Fourth, the Russians have helped install a pro-Russia US president and they have supported European breakaway movements such as the Brexit referendum and Catalonia's referendum, helping them financially and by providing propaganda on social media and conventional media.
Mr Putin's intent is clear - destabilise Russia's neighbours, sow discord, break up alliances, encourage factionalism and extremism, so that they pose no threat to Russia, and if Russia did decide to grab a bit more lebensraum then there would be no coordinated response.
That said, even with nuclear weapons backing up their troops, it is unlikely that Russia wants to invade Europe. Afghanistan was an object lesson and Iraq another. It is one thing to invade, it is quite a different thing to hold the ground. The Crimea has a Russian speaking majority so there is a lot of popular support there for the annexation. Poland would be a different story.
Why does Putin want to destabilise his neighbours? Essentially it is fear of change.
The Ukraine was about to sign an economic agreement with the EU. Its president, under pressure from Russia, rejected the agreement and signed one with Russia instead - which led him to be thrown out by the electorate. After this setback, Putin decided that if bribes didn't work then force would - Putin's money, propaganda and undercover troops between them fomented a civil war in the Crimea (which sits on the Russian border and has many ethnic Russians) giving him an excuse to annex the area - saying that he was protecting the Russians living there.
Russia once wielded immense power over most of eastern Europe. After the break up of the USSR Putin watched former satellite states won over to Western economic and political models. Russia itself was experimenting with a version of democracy and capitalism (though the oligarchs managed to commandeer and corrupt it). Putin was working for the KGB in East Germany when its government collapsed and reunification started - he saw how quickly the Communist system could be destroyed. In 2005 he said the collapse of the Soviet Union was the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the Twentieth Century... Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself."
Once Putin was in power he made it his mission to ensure that the Russian state would not suffer the same fate. His first task was to deal with Chechnya, a strategically important satellite state which had fought for and achieved independence from Russia in 1997. In 1999 Putin started a new war which ended with Chechnya capitulating and once more giving up their independence.
Then he moved on to the oligarchs, first making a 'grand bargain' with them, allowing them to maintain their power-bases as long as they supported him. Once he had them under his thumb he started to pick them off one by one. He started with the richest, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, president of the Yukos oil and gas company. Putin arrested Khodorkovsky and nationalised Yukos. He then moved on to Boris Berezovsky (owner of the TV network Channel One - seized and nationalised - who fled to Britain and was later found hanged in an apparent suicide) and Vladimir Gusinsky (imprisoned until he agreed to sell his media empire to the state). The remaining oligarchs decided it was best to support Putin unquestioningly.
Having secured Russia internally, Putin is now trying to maintain a buffer between itself and the West. Russia is still very weak economically, so his destabilisation strategy makes a lot of sense. It is relatively cheap, and eminently deniable.
Does this mean we shouldn't worry about Putin? Is he just an annoyance rather than a threat? The problem is that he sees us as a threat, and may not understand where to stop, even ignoring the fact that true Communists see the simple existence of democracy as an existential threat.
Russia under Putin is similar to the Branch Davidsons compound that was at Waco, arming themselves up for fear of what is around them, with a belief system seeing themselves as persecuted, at risk, with unbelievers all around them, their own members escaping, and a leader who is using these beliefs to make himself unassailable. Waco was a disaster - but at least they didn't have nuclear weapons.
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